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Introduction
A recent Research & Politics article by Knoll et al. (2015) 
raises questions about the generalizability of findings 
contained in three articles coming out of our laboratory 
(Dodd et al., 2012; Oxley et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2011). 
We welcome Knoll et al.’s interest and efforts and readily 
acknowledge that our previous studies, like all research, 
could have “gotten it wrong.” The scientific process works 
best when numerous research teams address a selected 
topic in order that results can be verified, challenged, 
extended, or modified. This process is greatly aided when 
those teams allow open access to their data, and we are 
happy to report that Knoll et al. responded promptly and 
professionally to our request for theirs. However, we are 
unconvinced that Knoll et al.’s “reproduction” study pro-
vides grounds for questioning the findings we reported 
earlier. In this comment, we first discuss negativity bias in 
general, then Knoll et al.’s specific results, and finally the 
likely reasons for their null findings.
Negativity bias
Negativity bias refers to the well-established and widely 
accepted empirical finding that people on average are sig-
nificantly more sensitive, attentive, and responsive to nega-
tive than to positive arousing stimuli. Evidence for this bias 
appears in a variety of cultural contexts and in the wake of 
an impressive range of research designs (for a review, see 
Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994). Further, negativity bias 
brings with it an obvious and compelling evolutionary 
logic: ignore a positive stimulus and you may not eat, 
ignore a negative stimulus and you may get eaten—or eat 
something that could do you harm.
Even as negativity bias appears to be something of a 
human universal, individual-level variation in it is known 
to exist and many hypotheses regarding the correlates of 
this variation have been offered and tested. The relevant 
hypothesis here is that heightened negativity bias is posi-
tively correlated with conservative political beliefs. 
Numerous studies along these lines have been published. 
For example, compared to liberals, conservatives weight 
negative information more heavily (Shook and Fazio, 
2009), remember negative stimuli more readily (Mills 
et al., 2016), attend to negative stimuli more intently 
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(Castelli and Carraro, 2011), report greater disgust sensitiv-
ity (Inbar et al., 2009), are more likely to feel threatened 
(Bonanno and Jost, 2006), have greater grey matter density 
in their amygdalas, an area of the brain often associated 
with emotional responses to negative events (Kanai et al., 
2011), and have greater amygdalic activation in response to 
risk (Schreiber et al., 2013).
Our three studies were intended to contribute to this 
growing literature on the correlation between negativity bias 
and political preferences by focusing on a rudimentary 
physiological rather than cognitive or neural response. 
Using standard measures of sympathetic nervous system 
response such as electrodermal activity (EDA; sometimes 
called skin conductance) we found that individuals with 
conservative beliefs on particular issues, especially those 
targeted at either sexual or “protective” behaviors, tend to 
have greater spikes in their EDA when presented with nega-
tive stimuli. Though our physiological results seem per-
fectly consistent with the large and growing literature on the 
deeper differences of liberals and conservatives, Knoll et al. 
were unable to reproduce them in their student sample.
Knoll et al.’s results
Aspects of Knoll et al.’s research design are similar to ours. 
The appropriate physiological sensors for measuring EDA 
were attached before 69 research participants were shown 
numerous images seriatim. Some of these images were 
threatening such as a criminal holding a gun; some were 
disgusting such as a toilet covered in vomit and fecal mat-
ter; some were positive such as a smiling baby; and some 
were neutral such as a plain piece of toast.
Given the widely acknowledged existence of a negativ-
ity bias, a basic validity check on data collection proce-
dures in this research design is examining whether, as 
expected, negative images (threatening and disgusting 
images), elicit a significantly greater EDA response than 
the neutral or positive images. Knoll et al. do not report 
such a validity check. When we examine their data, we find 
no statistically significant difference in EDA response for 
non-threatening images and either threatening (t(63)=0.63, 
p=0.53) or disgusting images (t(62)=0.69, p=0.49). In 
short, their data suggest that on average people are not 
more responsive to negative than to non-negative stimuli. 
This finding potentially has broad-reaching implications 
because it challenges the longstanding empirical record that 
a negativity bias is a universal human trait. For reasons that 
are not entirely clear, Knoll et al. skip over this result in 
order to analyze the correlation of political preferences 
with the degree of negativity bias where, in contrast to our 
results, they do indeed fail to find a significant relationship 
between degree of negativity bias and political beliefs.
One explanation for their null finding may indeed be that 
the results we reported in earlier studies do not replicate, 
that is, the relationships we reported are artifacts of small 
samples, chance, failure to properly account for all causes of 
EDA fluctuations, some unknown contamination in our sub-
ject pool, or some other reason. Like all scientists we accept 
that identifying robust relationships requires replication and 
we must be willing to accept the null if results from our 
laboratory do not “travel.” An alternate explanation, how-
ever, is that their data are not reliable enough to address this 
important question of external validity. Given the absence of 
an overall negativity bias in their data—that is, their failure 
to find a relationship with high levels of external validity—
it is obviously going to be difficult to demonstrate that indi-
vidual-level variation in that (non-existent) negativity bias 
correlates with variation in anything else, including political 
attitudes. Instead of focusing on our three studies on the 
association of negativity bias and political preferences, 
Knoll et al. seem positioned to fry a much bigger fish; 
namely the existence of negativity bias in the first place. 
Such a bold claim, however, would require data and proce-
dures that were up to the challenge, and on this point we fear 
that Knoll et al.’s results may come up short.
Knoll et al.’s procedures
Knoll et al. explicitly state that their study is an attempted 
“reproduction” of our research rather than an attempted “rep-
lication.” This caveat is important as their question wording, 
photographic stimuli, and sample composition differ signifi-
cantly from our studies. As they put it, their methods are “an 
attempt to ‘reproduce’ the same findings in a novel context 
with slightly varying conditions to determine the extent of 
their generalizability” (Knoll et al., 2015: 3). They are abso-
lutely correct that making slight deviations in research proto-
cols is vital for assessing the convergent validity of established 
findings; however, we view their deviations as considerable 
in magnitude. We will limit our discussion to two major 
departures—physiological data collection procedures and 
stimulus selection—that raise substantive questions about 
comparing their results to those from our studies.
The data for Dodd et al. (2012), Oxley et al. (2008), and 
Smith et al. (2011) came from one of two data collection 
periods in the summers of 2007 and 2008. Each sample of 
roughly 50 non-student participants was drawn from a 
larger representative sample of 200 people, and only nine 
individuals participated in both the 2007 and 2008 data col-
lection periods. Each research participant was isolated in a 
light and temperature controlled laboratory for stimulus 
presentation (on a computer screen right in front of them) 
and physiological recording. The idea was to exercise as 
much control as possible over the environment, thereby 
maximizing participant attention to the presented stimulus 
rather than environmental distractions.
Knoll et al.’s approach was significantly different. In their 
study, subjects did not view stimuli in isolation, nor did they 
view stimuli on a computer screen immediately in front of 
them. In their study, participants came in groups of 15–20, 
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were seated at individual computer stations, and were hooked 
up to the physiological data acquisition equipment. Their 
stimulus presentation took place not on an individual com-
puter but on a single overhead projection viewed by the 
entire group in the large room, and there was no indication 
that this room was light and temperature controlled (impor-
tant because human physiology responds to ambient light 
and temperature). These procedures raise concerns about 
potential confounds—for example, participants may have 
been influenced by other people in the room or by variations 
in the distance from the screen rather than by a stimulus pre-
sented in isolation. The large number of potential distractions 
may explain why, in contrast to existing research, Knoll et al. 
failed to find a significant overall negativity bias in their 
respondents. In any event, collecting physiological data from 
large groups of people at the same time is not standard prac-
tice in psychophysiological research.
If we set aside concerns that these procedures may intro-
duce noise and/or diminished effects into the data collected, 
the lack of negativity bias in Knoll et al.’s findings could 
constitute an interesting contribution to the broader litera-
ture on physiology and negativity bias. Previous examina-
tions of negativity bias occur with participants who are 
isolated from other participants. Is it possible that when 
people are in groups a noticeable reduction in negativity 
bias occurs? This possibility is consistent with Knoll et al.’s 
findings and, if correct, would be an interesting and even 
valuable addition to our current understanding of the social 
nature of the human species. Nonetheless, given the devia-
tions from standard procedure, it is impossible to tell if the 
inability to reproduce the findings from our laboratory is 
due to a failure of external validity in our studies or a failure 
of internal validity in Knoll et al.’s studies.
Stimulus choice is another concern. Smith et al. specifi-
cally chose three images that captured what is labeled as 
“core or contamination disgust” (Smith et al., 2011: 3). 
These images were of a man eating a handful of worms, an 
emaciated but alive body, and excrement floating in a toilet. 
These images were chosen because they captured a specific 
concept. In their reproduction of this study, Knoll et al. used 
images that likely do not tap the same target concept of core 
or contamination disgust. For example, images of a bloody 
wound and a bloodied face (two of the images employed by 
Knoll et al.) arguably are more likely to provoke a threat (or 
at least animal reminder disgust) rather than a core disgust 
response—indeed, they are highly similar to images Knoll 
et al. used to capture physiological responses to threat 
(r=0.98, p<0.001). Knoll et al. appear to be measuring dif-
ferent concepts than the Smith et al. study, which would cer-
tainly help to explain the lack of similarity in the results.
Conclusion
Moving forward, there are a number of factors that schol-
ars conducting replication and reproduction studies 
should note. In particular, we encourage the use of non-
student samples with participants isolated in light and 
temperature controlled rooms, who are exposed to stimuli 
in exactly the same way (e.g. stimulus presentation is 
always from the same distance). Furthermore, as a valid-
ity check we encourage a rigorous process of stimulus 
selection—that is, pretesting stimuli—to ensure selected 
stimuli are conceptually appropriate. Finally, we also 
encourage basic validity checks on physiological data 
collected during the course of these investigations. For 
example, it is fairly straightforward to check for some-
thing like negativity bias by checking mean differences 
between negative versus neutral or positive stimuli. If 
that test confirms negativity bias—a general human 
trait—it provides prima facie evidence that the data are 
accurately tapping into well understood physiological 
responses.
We are in complete agreement with Knoll et al.’s call 
for more replication and reproduction. Pushing this line 
of research forward is vitally important, as there is still 
much work to do in order to understand the degree to 
which these findings hold across multiple contexts. While 
confident in the internal validity of our studies, we are 
well aware that external validity is an issue that can only 
be addressed by replication, preferably in other laborato-
ries. Our studies used two distinct adult samples with 
relatively small N’s from a politically diverse but geo-
graphically compact area. Do our findings travel beyond 
that? The only honest answer is that we do not know and 
cannot know until other laboratories have weighed in. 
The nature of data collection in the area of physiology 
sometimes precludes large-N studies for reasons as var-
ied as resource limitations and the time intensive nature 
of the data collection process. This limitation opens the 
door for the vagaries of small-N studies to produce non-
generalizable results. For that reason, we would like to 
echo Knoll et al.’s call for further research and thank 
them for taking the first steps in that direction. However, 
in this case, their failure to detect even a general negativ-
ity bias, probably due to notable departures from stand-
ard research practices for collecting physiological data, 
compromises their ability to speak directly to the external 
validity of our findings.
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